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R
ecent developments in financial markets have lately
dominated discussions about monetary policy. Analysts
have noted that the effective federal funds rate has been
trading relatively far from the target value set by the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC). This is not uncommon in
the face of financial market uncertainty. One of the defining
features of crises is that markets tend to be more volatile, and
the volatility can make it more difficult for the Fed to maintain
the effective federal funds rate at the FOMC target. 
To obtain some perspective on how the effective federal
funds rate behaves in times of turmoil, we compare the recent
behavior of the effective federal funds rate to its behavior in
1998. In the autumn of that year, the collapse of Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM) sent shock waves through finan-
cial markets somewhat similarly to recent events involving the
subprime mortgage market.
The chart shows daily data on the federal funds target and
the associated effective federal funds rate for two episodes—
the 1998 collapse of LTCM and the current case. (The 2007
data are in the lower portion of the chart and use
the left axis, while the 1998 data are in the upper
portion of the chart and use the right axis.) The
data are aligned to the dates when each crisis
became especially pronounced: September 23,
1998, the date of the LTCM collapse; and, recently,
August 9, 2007.
The data in the lower portion of the chart have
often been cited in recent discussions. The effec-
tive federal funds rate hovered near target until
August 9, then deviated relatively far from target
after that date. For the 1998 episode, the pre-
crisis effective federal funds rate was somewhat
more volatile than in the current episode. In both
cases, volatility rose sharply at the height of the
crisis. The standard deviation of the difference
between the effective federal funds rate and the
target during the 1998 post-crisis data is 28 basis
points through the end of 1998. The post-crisis
standard deviation for the current episode so far
is only 18 basis points. By this measure, the 1998
post-crisis period was more volatile.
The increase in the standard deviation post-
crisis versus pre-crisis, though, has been much
larger in the current episode. The 1998 pre-crisis
standard deviation was about 15 basis points,
excluding a particularly large deviation on June 30 of that year.
The ratio of the post- to pre-crisis standard deviation is then 28/15,
or approximately 1.9; volatility definitely increased, almost dou-
bling after the onset of the crisis. In the more recent experience,
though, the ratio of the post- to pre-crisis standard deviation is
18/3, or 6.0. This is perhaps what many have in mind in consid-
ering the 2007 event—volatility increased by a factor of six after
the onset of the crisis. 
However, this increase occurred mainly because the pre-crisis
standard deviation is so small: only 3 basis points in this calcu-
lation. This could be viewed as a testament to the Fed’s ability
to maintain the effective federal funds rate close to target during
tranquil times. With such a small pre-crisis standard deviation,
most disruptions are going to seem relatively large. From a his-
torical perspective, the 18-basis-point standard deviation of recent
weeks is not particularly disturbing.
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